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FEDERAL ARTS FUNDING AT WHAT
COST? THE IMPACT OF FUNDING
GUIDELINES ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE
OF ART IN AMERICA
In art, immorality cannot exist. Art is always sacred even when it
takes for a subject the worst excesses of desire. Since it has in
view only the sincerity of observation, it cannot debase itself. A
true work of art is always noble, even when it translates the stir-
rings of the brute, for at that moment, the artist who has produced
it had as his only objective, the most conscientious rendering pos-
sible of the impression he has felt.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the rights most cherished by Americans is the guarantee
of free speech.2 We have known for a long time that this guarantee
does not protect libelous statements,3 "fighting words",4 or such
speech as falsely shouting "fire!" in a crowded theatre,' where the
police powers6 are clearly implicated. The Supreme Court has also
made clear that the free speech guarantee does not protect "ob-
scenity".' Recognizing that "obscenity" is an inherently subjective
term,8 the Court has over the years, struggled to delimit it - not
surprisingly, to little avail.9 Various governmental attempts of late
to make "obscenity" a more inclusive concept, have awakened a
fear in many Americans that the guarantee of free speech may not
1. Rodin, Antee (1907), reprinted in 1 J. Mymmuu & A. ELSEN, Lw, ETmcs Amm
nx VmuAL AwRs [hereinafter "MmmymwL & EwEN"] at 240-41 (2d ed. 1987).
2. The first amendment provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
3. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
4. Fighting words are "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace". Id.
5. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
6. The police powers of a state refer to its interest in and right to enforce laws
protecting the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. See e.g., People v. Radich,
26 N.Y.2d 114, 119, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 849, 257 N.E.2d 30, 32 (1970).
7. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("[olbscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press").
8. As Justice Stewart asserted in his concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964): "[I] know it [obscenity] when I see it."
9. As Justice Brennan exclaimed in his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Sla-
ton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973): "No other aspect of the First Amendment has, in recent
years, demanded so substantial a commitment of our time, generated such dishar-
mony of views, and remained so resistant to the formulation of stable and managea-
ble standards" as obscenity. Later in his opinion he referred to the Court's dilemma
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be much of a guarantee at all. There is no better illustration of this
than the subject of federal funding for the arts.'0
While it is true that stabs at free expression in arts funding have
met with less success than the government had hoped, I I it cannot be
denied that the repeated attempts to screen for obscenity over the
past few years signal a distinct drive by the government to repress
- to control the content and form of expression. Worse, whether
ultimately upheld or not as "constitutional" invasions of the freedom
of expression, this series of governmental encroachments may have
already left an indelible mark on the future of American art.
The issue is deserving of study not only for the immediate reason
that the constitutionality of portions of the 1989 and 1990 arts fund-
ing laws have been challenged in courts across the country, 12 but
for the broader reason that the continuing deliberations over and
preoccupation with these funding laws makes clear just how tenuous
our first amendment guarantees may be.'" Indeed, it has been said
that this is not simply a battle over obscenity, "[tihis is about the very
principles of democracy and the fundamental values of this coun-
of applying "inevitably obscure standards" in judging something "obscene". Id. at
92.
Thus, the situation had not changed much since 1957, when in his dissent in Roth,
354 U.S. at 512 (which Justice Black joined), Justice Douglas quipped: "If experi-
ence in this field teaches anything, it is that 'censorship of obscenity has almost
always been both irrational and indiscriminate."' (citation omitted).
10. This has been viewed by some as a crusade to return to an "officially sanc-
tioned, state-supported, state-approved art." Artist Chuck Close (quoted in N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 1989, at 1, col. 2).
11. In fact, each stroke has engendered such public derision that the govern-
ment has been pressured to make concessions, and successive funding laws and
policies have been tempered. Additionally, several prominent cases challenging
aspects of the various laws and policies have been successful. See e.g. Bella
Lewitzky Dance Foundation v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D.Cal. 1991), in-
fra at Sec. I1 B-C; Newport Harbor Art Museum v. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts
(companion case to Lewitzky); and New School v. Frohnmayer, No. 90-3510
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (settled and suit terminated, Feb. 20, 1991), infra, notes 116-118
and accompanying text.
12. Nat'l L., Nov. 5, 1990 at 12 (citing, New School v. Frohnmayer, supra note
11; Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v. Frohnmayer, supra note 11; Newport Har-
bor Museum v. NEA, supra note 11; Fordyce v. Frohnmayer No. 90-2106 (Char-
lottesville, Va. 1990); and the "NEA Four", infra note 217.
13. Martha Wilson, director of Franklin Furnace, an avant-garde performance
space in TriBeCa, learned "how tenuous" these freedoms might be when, after she
was promised two arts grants, the General Accounting Office, "acting on a demand
by Senator Helms", asked to examine her records. They wanted to see when and
how frequently four artists, known for their sexually provocative work, performed
there. Wilson commented on the "growing atmosphere of repression," brought
about by the government which she believes is "trying to starve organizations and
artists that have unwanted ideas." N.Y. Times, July 18, 1990, at 11, col. 4.
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try." '14 This is a "battle for the soul of America."1s
Clearly, while the debate revolves around defining obscenity, it
involves a wide spectrum of issues, such as:
1. Does the federal government have any responsibility to fund
art in the first place?
2. Once the government does decide to sponsor art,16 are con-
tent-based restrictions on sponsorship constitutionally
permissible?
3. Given the mandate of the National Endowment for the Arts
[hereinafter "NEA"], are content-based restrictions for grant
applicants/recipients statutorily permissible?
4. How would such restrictions be implemented and supervised
even-handedly?
5. Should the legislative branch of the government be permitted
to intrude on the grant making process, or should it merely set
up the means for sponsorship, leaving the funding decisions to
politically insulated panels of art experts?
6. Can artists be required to promise in writing or otherwise, to
use their federal grants to further only ends of which the NEA
officially approves, or is this a "prior restraint"?17
7. What sort of chilling effect would such a requirement or a
threat of funds being rescinded have on artistic creation?
8. Is it important or even worthwhile to sponsor art which has as
its goal "to shock and disturb the public, to attack its conven-
tions and assumptions, to disturb it"? 18
This note attempts to analyze these and other issues in the recent
controversy over federal arts funding. The primary focus is on the
constitutionality of the various laws and internal policies adopted by
the government to screen grant applications for obscenity and to
14. Dr. Mary Schmidt-Campbell, Commissioner of Cultural Affairs for New York
City (quoted in N.Y. Post, Mar. 24, 1990, at 19, col. 1).
15. Schmidt-Campbell (quoted in N.Y. Times, July 12, 1990, at 19, col. 1).
16. The National Council on the Arts, established in 1964, was the nation's first
attempt - years behind nearly every other major government in the world - to
encourage and nurture the artistic and cultural resources available to its citizens.
The Foundation on the Arts and Humanities was created to implement the Council's
plans. The Foundation, in turn, is composed of a National Endowment for the Arts,
a National Endowment for the Humanities, and a Federal Council on the Arts and
the Humanities. Mmy1w. & ELssx, supra note 1, at 341.
The NEA is an independent agency of the United States. Its authorizing legisla-
tion mandates that government not enter into the funding process. The idea is that
politics and art should be kept separate from one another. See generally, id. at
342-48, as discussed infra, notes 83-84 and accompanying text. The Supreme
Court in Roth, 354 U.S. at 488 expressed its support for this notion of freedom from
governmental intrusion into the domain of free speech: "The door barring federal
and state intrusion into this area [of free speech and press] cannot be left ajar; it
must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to pre-
vent encroachment upon more important interests." (citation omitted).
17. This term is discussed, infra note 74 and accompanying text.
18. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1990, at 15, col. 2.
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prevent the production of obscene works by grantees once money is
awarded. A discussion of the NEA's mandate illustrates why the re-
cent funding laws are, in any case, statutorily impermissible. Part I
briefly relates how the original funding law evolved and what con-
stitutional questions it raised. Subsequent actions of Congress and
the NEA independently are examined, as is the current focus of the
debate. Part III explores the history of political and "perverse"
speech in art, and hypothesizes why "obscene" speech has been rel-
egated to its present status by the judicial system and government.
This Part also analyzes the first amendment's treatment of non-verbal
or "symbolic" speech. Part IV reviews the first amendment's treat-
ment of obscenity and artistic expression, and explains why the
Supreme Court's definition as applied by the NEA has been deemed
"void for vagueness". Part V considers the after-effects of the law.
Finally, Part VI concludes that the NEA is critical to the survival of
experimental art in the United States, and that the intrusion of poli-
tics into funding decisions interferes greatly with the NEA's mandate
and ability to nurture the creative spirit in America.' 9 The sugges-
tion is made that should the NEA return to its former merit-based
screening practices, it may be that it is too little, too late. To expect
the NEA to be able, suddenly, to forget about content when screen-
ing applications would be like telling someone not to think about
elephants. It is a foregone conclusion that they will fail.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
A. The Birth of an Issue
Modem art is Communistic because it is distorted and ugly, be-
cause it does not glorify our beautiful country, our cheerful and
smiling people, and our material progress. Art which does not
glorify our beautiful country in plain, simple terms that everyone
can understand breeds dissatisfaction. It is therefore opposed to
our government, and those who create and promote it are our
enemies. 2
0
The recent arts funding controversy began when, in 1988, the
NEA supported an exhibition at a museum in Winston-Salem, N.C.
which included a photo by Andres Serrano entitled "Piss Christ".
The photo featured a cheap plastic crucifix suspended in a jar of the
artist's urine. Just after this, the Corcoran Gallery in Washington,
D.C. mounted their NEA funded exhibition of photos by the late
Robert Mapplethorpe, an artist whose name has become synony-
mous with the words "controversial" and "homoerotic".
19. See NEA mandate, infra note 83.
20. George Dondero (R-Mich), (quoted in MEstyMAN & ELsEN, supra note 1, at
268). Dondero was a McCarthy era spokesman who believed that all modem art -
in its "depraved", "destructive" forms - was communist inspired.
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These exhibits sparked a steamy debate in Congress over the sum-
mer of 1988, with Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) leading the drive for
expansive funding restrictions.21  The bill that was eventually
passed in Congress was not as broad as Helms' proposal, but it nev-
ertheless included a "laundry list" of prohibitions. 22
B. Substance of the Original Funding Law
In late October of 1989, President Bush signed a new one-year
National Arts Funding Law which altered the screening guidelines
for awarding federal arts grants through the National Endowment
for the Arts.23 Specifically, the funding law required that federal
grants not be used for the promotion, dissemination, or production
of "materials considered obscene", such as works depicting "sado-
masochism, homoeroticism, sexual exploitation of children or in,i-
viduals engaged in sex acts" and "which, when taken as a whole, do
not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value."'24
In addition, the NEA - independent of Congress - added a
"certification" requirement to the form grant recipients had to sub-
mit to the NEA to obtain funding once notified of an award. The
grantee had to certify in advance that "none of the funds awarded
would be used 'to promote, disseminate, or produce materials which
21. Helms' bill, rejected by Congress, would have precluded the use of federal
monies to: "promote, disseminate or produce obscene or indecent materials, in-
cluding art which denigrates, debases or reviles a person, group or class of citizens
on the basis of race, creed, sex, handicap, age or national origin." N.Y. Times, (edi-
torial page) Nov. 17, 1989.
22. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. Although the House-Senate Con-
ference Committee which negotiated the compromise rejected a Senate authorized
five-year ban on financial support for the two particular organizations which spon-
sored the Serrano and Mapplethorpe exhibits, it agreed that if the NEA wished to
bestow a grant on either of these organizations in the future, it would have to "no-
tify" the two congressional committees which oversee the Endowment. In addition,
all art financed through the hundreds of subgrants given out each year would there-
after have to be screened by the NEA chair and council. Finally, the NEA's budget
was cut by $45,000 - a penalty equal to the combined amount paid in federal
grant money to the two arts organizations in question. The NEA was thus penalized
- as were the artists whose works were taken from the walls and the patrons who
were robbed of the artistic experience - for shows funded before the new mandate
was drafted and signed by the President. Similarly, the AIDS show grant was origi-
nally given before Congress had even begun debating the funding issue, and was
retracted after the law went into effect. See discussion, infra notes 27-31 and ac-
companying text.
23. The NEA, a federally created agency, uses tax dollars to award merit-based
grants to certain exceptional artists and arts institutions, through government se-
lected peer review panels.
24. Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
102, Sec. 304(a), 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989). This law was the result of a "compro-
mise" from the stringent prohibition sought by conservatives.
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in the judgement of the NEA ... [could] be considered obscene'."
The fear in the artworld was that these new policies would force the
NEA to focus on the content of the work in approving funds, rather
than on the artistic merit of the piece(s), as was the former
practice. 26
This fear was realized in the NEA's first actions after the law came
into effect. In November of 1989, NEA Chairman John Frohnmayer
revoked (and then amidst public pressure eventually re-issued)27 a
$10,000 grant to an art gallery in New York City for its exhibition
on AIDS. Though the grant had been promised to the gallery sev-
eral months prior to the new law's enactment, it was retracted by
Frohnmayer because of the exhibit's content.28  According to
Frohnmayer, the exhibit had become "primar(il)y . .. political" 29
"rather than artistic" in nature;30 and "political discourse ought to
be in the political arena and not in a show sponsored by the
Endowment.13 1
C. Problems with the Law - The Focus of the Debate
Proponents of the funding law have asserted that: (1) the govern-
ment is not rendering illegal the production or exhibition of certain
art, it is merely denying its support of such art.3 2 Furthermore, be-
cause the federal government has no obligation to fund art in the
first place, 3 restrictions on which art is funded cannot by definition
25. Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 776 (emphasis added) (citing Paragraph Two of
NEA promulgated "General Terms and Conditions for Organizational Grant Recip-
ients". In the Lewitzky case, the court found that the defendants, the NEA, were
"withholding plaintiffs' grant proceeds as a direct result of plaintiffs' refusal to sign
the certification." Id. at 779.
26. NEA Chairman John Frohnmayer's own comment made shortly after the law
was passed, is revealing: The NEA "make[s] our decision on the artistic content [of
the work]." N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, sec. 2 at 1, 25, col. 1 (emphasis added).
27. The grant was returned on the contingency that the NEA fund only the exhi-
bition and not the show's "controversial" catalog. Further, a disclaimer would have
to be put in the catalog regarding the lack of NEA support for it.
28. See infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text. Frohnmayer actually took
issue with both the exhibit and its accompanying catalog, which criticized various
public figures.
29. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1989, at C33, col. 1.
30. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1989, at 17, col. 1.
31. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, sec. 2 at 1, 25, col. 1.
32. See Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1986)("[t]he guarantee
of freedom of speech 'does not mean. that government must be ideologically "neu-
tral",' or... prevent government from 'add[ing] its own voice to the many that it
must tolerate.'" (quoting L. TRIBE, Ammuc-f CoNSTILMONuL LAw 588, 590 (1978));
see also, Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 796 (1st Cir.
1976)("[n]eutrality in a program for public funding of the arts is inconceivable ....
[for] the very definition of ('art']... requires an exercise of judgment from case to
case.")
33. See Began v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540,
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involve issues of "censorship" 4 and/or "prior restraint";" (2) in the
midst of a recession, conservation of funds for the arts should be
encouraged;3 6 some screening process must be established, and
content is as valid a discretionary factor as any;37 and (3) after all,
shouldn't taxpayers have a say in how their money is spent?
1. The Obligation to Fund
Screening based on content for funding purposes may not render
the creation of certain artwork illegal, i.e. it may not constitute cen-
sorship per se, but for the NEA to "merely deny" grant money to
"troublemakers" is de facto censorship - it ultimately results in
censorship.
This is largely because of the instrumental role the NEA has set
out to and, in fact, does play in the American art world. 8 Through
the NEA, the government has, in effect, created for itself an obliga-
tion to fund. As one court recently held:
550 (1982) ("[the Constitution 'does not confer an entitlement to such [government
given] funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of (the] freedom [of
speech].' ") (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980)).
34. The notion of censorship will be discussed generally infra, at Sec. C 1.
35. The issue of "prior restraint" will be discussed infra notes 74-82 and accom-
panying text.
36. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 238 (1981) ("Congress should have
discretion in deciding how to expend necessarily limited resources."). But see N.Y.
Post, Nov. 18, 1989, wherein it is reported that the U.S. government spends only as
much money on the arts, as a whole, as it does on military bands.
37. See The Alan Guttmacher Institute v. McPherson, 616 F. Supp. 195, 202
(D.C.N.Y. 1985) ("(blecause of the tremendous volume of expression, the govern-
ment cannot undertake to subsidize any of it without being highly selective - it
must be able to base its decision in large part on the content of the publications it
chooses to aid.").
38. As the court found in Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 783:
[he NEA occupies a dominant and influential role in the financial affairs
of the art world in the United States. Because the NEA provides much of
its support with conditions that require matching or co-funding from pri-
vate sources [generally the NEA is not permitted to fund more than 50% of
the total cost of a project, and usually funds at a ratio of three to one], the
NEA's funding involvement in a project necessarily has a multiplier effect
in the competitive market for funding of artistic endeavors. ... '[Most non-
federal funding sources regard the NEA award as an imprimatur that signi-
fies the recipient's artistic merit and value. NEA grants lend prestige and
legitimacy to projects and are therefore critical to the ability of artists and
companies to attract non-federal funding sources.' Grant applicants rely
on the NEA well beyond the dollar value of any particular grant.
(quoting amicus Theatre Communications Group) (footnote omitted). NEA grants
in 1988 totalled $119 million, which, due to the NEA's matching funds policy, gen-
erated a full $1.36 billion in private funding. Note, Free Speech and Government
Funding: Does the Government Have to Fund What it Doesn't Like?, 56 BRooKL'n
L. REv. 213, 257-58 (citing Rockefeller Foundation statistics in L.A. Times, Jul. 20,
1990, at Fl, col. 5.).
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The NEA's role and influence may mean that if an artist chooses
not to be bound by the NEA's obscenity restriction, he will not be
able to obtain private funding, and therefore, will be worse off
than if he had not applied for an NEA grant at all. 9
The court explained that while plaintiffs may not actually be able
to claim rights to NEA grants, 40 once the government "moves to sub-
sidize", it cannot deny benefits to applicants on unconstitutional
grounds. 4' In other words, by making itself the primary supporter of
new talents and struggling institutions in the artworld, the govern-
ment has, in a sense, preempted or controlled the entire process by
which art does or does not become accessible to the American mar-
ket. Such a role carries with it the obligation to act in comportment
with the Constitution.
While "mere refusal" to subsidize a fundamental right is not un-
constitutional if it " 'places no obstacle in the path' of a plaintiff
seeking to exercise that right," 42 the Lewitzky court found the NEA's
certification requirement - especially in view of the extensive
39. Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 785.
40. The court was referring to the following statements made by the Supreme
Court in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972):
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a
person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though
the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there
are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally pro-
tected interests - especially, his interest in freedom of speech.
See Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 548 (Congress may not "discrimi-
nate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'ai[m] at the suppression of dan-
gerous ideas.' ") (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)).
41. Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 784-85. See Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson,
532 F.2d 792, 798 n.8 (1st Cir. 1976) ("[d]istribution of arts grants on the basis of
such extrinsic considerations as the applicants' political views, associations, or ac-
tivities would violate the equal protection clause, if not the first amendment, by
penalizing the exercise of those freedoms"); cf. Police Dep't of the City of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[a]bove all else, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content"); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm., 447 U.S. 530, 533 (the protection afforded speech "does not depend upon
the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual").
42. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980), as cited in Lewitzky at 784. The
Court in Harris v. McRae reasoned that:
t]he financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy
the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the prod-
uct not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of
her indigency. [Therefore] .. .. regardless of whether the freedom of a
woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy.., lies at the core.., of the
due process liberty [interest] ... it simply does not follow that a woman's
freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the finan-
cial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices.
Id. at 316.
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role 4 ' the NEA plays in arts funding - to present such an
obstacle:
4 4
[An artist cannot ... ignore the vague certification requirement
and be no worse off than if the NEA had not entered the funding
business at all .... This is the type of obstacle in the path of the
exercise of fundamental speech rights that the constitution will not
tolerate.4
S
a. Screening Guidelines
What the Lewitzky court found offensive about the certification
requirement can be applied to the screening guidelines in general.
Indeed, while the certification requirement remained in place for
1990 grantees until just before this note went to press in March of
1991,46 the screening language proved so controversial that it w-As
not included in the 1990 legislation. It was however, incorporated
by way of reference into the certification requirement. 4 7 The con-
nection between the two was made clear by the court in its ruling on
the certification issue. The court held that the government:
[M]ay not place restrictions on disbursement of those grants that
require grantees to certify to obscenity provisions that are vague
in violation of the Fifth Amendment,4 and which correspond-
ingly cause a chilling effect in violation of the First Amendment
.... 4' [It] ... go[es] well beyond a simple decision not to subsi-
43. See supra note 25; Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 785.
44. Id.
45. Id. (emphasis added). As has been pointed out, funding from private
sources is not easy to garner. Not only do private sources tend first to look to see if
the federal government has given (and not rescinded) its approval of the work (i.e.
supplied funds) before supplying additional subsidies, many organizations restrict
funding based on, inter alia, the activities in question, the subject matter, the tax
exempt status of the group (precluding funding to individuals), or the professed
ideologies of the applicant. Note, supra note 38 at 256-57. Furthermore, private
sources are less dependable than the government: whereas the available assets of
both are vulnerable to swings in the economic climate from year to year, the gov-
ernment's decision to withdraw funds from programs is subject to debate and com-
promise, while private sources may withdraw funds without notice as they wish. Id.
46. See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the Feb.
1991 agreement regarding the certification requirement for 1990 grantees.
47. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text discussing the Lewitzky
court's application of the "void for vagueness" doctrine to the certification require-
ment, rendering the requirement in violation of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.
49. The Lewitzky court found that because of its "unconstitutionally vague" pro-
visions, the certification requirement has a "chilling effect" on artistic expression,
in violation of the first amendment rights of grant recipients. Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp.
at 785. That is, the vagueness of the provisions would cause grant recipients to
"'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' than if the boundaries of the forbidden area
were clearly marked," Id. at 783 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
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dize obscene speech. 0
The screening guidelines, in several ways, abridged the constitu-
tional rights of artists and art institutions applying for grants. First,
artists' first amendment rights were infringed because the law, by
arbitrarily classifying entire categories of subject matter as "ob-
scene", in effect imposed a new national standard on "obscenity",
which may or may not have had anything to do with the state statutes
in the localities to which an artist's work traveled, and therefore, to
which the artist was subject. In fact, the NEA's standard may have
been broader than the state standards to which a particular artist
was otherwise subject. Yet, each artist had also to heed the NEA's
definition of obscenity, a definition more inclusive even, than the
Supreme Court's latest test.
By defining obscenity in less specific terms than did the NEA in its
policy, the Supreme Court in Miller v. California,5 l provided more
protection for, inter alia, artists. The Court's definition was made
purposely broad in acknowledgment of the fact that "obscenity" is a
concept which does not lend itself to objective definition. Rather, it
depends on individual and/or communal reaction and is reflective
of the time and place in which it is experienced.
For a work to be considered "obscene" under Miler, the "basic
guidelines for the trier of fact must be":
5 2
(1) 'Mhe average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest...,
(2) [The work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and
(3) [The work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.5 3
The first prong allows local communities to define obscenity, thus
demonstrating an acknowledgement and a tolerance of the inevita-
bly varying standards throughout the nation.5 4 The second prong
(1958)) and "'restrict... their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe.'" Id.
at 783 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
50. Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 785 (emphasis added).
51. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
52. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
54. The Court further held:
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations
on the powers of the States do not vary from community to community, but
this does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed uniform na-
tional standards of precisely what appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is
'patently offensive.' These are essentially questions of fact, and our nation
is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that
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permits each state to choose its own standards for censorable sexual
conduct, rather than apply a fixed national standard.
The NEA's screening guidelines, by delineating which entire top-
ics could not be addressed by grant applicants, imposed a national
definition on obscenity in contravention of the first and second
prongs of Miller. While the Miller Court even suggested general
examples of what a state might censor,"5 it did not imply that the
federal government should choose its own standards. In fact, even
though the Court has, since Miller, upheld federal obscenity statutes
which define "obscene" as: "the sort of patently offensive represen-
tations or descriptions of that specific hard core sexual conduct
given as examples in Miller,"16 research has not revealed an in-
stance in which the Court has upheld a federal obscenity statute
enumerating prohibited acts and depictions to the degree done in
the NEA's screening guidelines. In adopting the funding law, tLa
federal government clearly went beyond the Miller examples. By
designating broad categories of artistic subject matter as obscene,
Congress suddenly and impermissibly chose to define obscenity for
its purposes more inclusively than the Supreme Court did in
Miller.5 7
The second manner in which the screening guidelines abridged
the constitutional rights of artists, involved the third prong of the
Miller test. The Supreme Court has always been loathe to scrutinize
artwork for obscenity,5 8 and under Miller's third prong - serious
value - artists are "virtually guarant[eed]" protection.5 9 Although
such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formula-
tion .... [It] would be an exercise in futility ....
Id. at 30. Fourteen years later, in Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), the Court
did, however, concede that a national standard should govern the third prong.
55. The Court stated:
We emphasize that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes for
the States. That must await their concrete legislative efforts. It is possible,
however, to give a few plain examples of what a state statute could define
for regulation under [the second prong of the test]:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual
acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, ex-
cretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
Id. at 25.
56. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 776 (1977)-(citing Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974) (construing 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1461, prohibiting mail-
ing of obscene matter); and United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Film, 413 U.S.
123, 130 n.7 (1973) (construing 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1462, prohibiting importation or
transportation of obscene matter)).
57. As Justice Douglas noted in his dissent in Miller, if freedom of expression
were ever to be diminished in any way, it would have to "be done by constitutional
amendment after full debate by the people." 413 U.S. at 41.
58. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 at 487-88; see infra note 87.
59. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1990, at A26, col. 1 (quoting Constitutional Lawyer
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this third prong was the one prong paid lip service by the funding
law, it did not shield artists and art institutions as the Miller Court
intended. Under the funding law, if the subject matter of a work fell
into any one of the proscribed categories, 60 the work by definition
could not possibly have "serious value" and thus all funding consid-
eration came to an end.
b. Certification Requirement
As noted, while the constitutionality of the screening guidelines
was never tested in court, the certification requirement was held un-
constitutional by a federal judge in Los Angeles in January of
1991.61 Worse than the denial of funding based on screening
guidelines, the certification requirement involved the revocation of
government sponsorship already promised. When grant recipients
refused to sign the pledge, they were at once "cut off indefinitely"
from the grant money already assured them, without any benefit of
administrative or judicial review of the decision.62
Grant recipients have argued that this forces them to certify in
advance that they will submit to a standard which is "void for vague-
ness". 63 The "vagueness", at least to those protesting in 1989, re-
sulted from the fact that the NEA appointed itself the judge of what
was "obscene", and grantees were forced to "speculate about how
Floyd Abrams). Most art passes the "pure speech" test of United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968); see infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
61. Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal.
1991).
62. Id. at 780.
63. "A statute may' be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to
people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes." United
States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Schwartzmiller v.
Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1984)). The Ninth Circuit held in
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-9 (1972):
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vague-
ness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several
important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer be-
tween lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,
so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those
who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy mat-
ters to. policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and sub-
jective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application. Third... where a vague statute 'abuts upon sensitive areas of
basic First Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to inhibit the exercise of
[those] freedoms.'. Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far
wider of the unlawful zone'... than if the boundaries of the forbidden
areas were clearly marked.
(cited in Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp: at 781) (emphasis added).
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the NEA [would] assess obscenity".
By the time the Lewitzky case got to court, the NEA had an-
nounced that it would henceforth be relying on the Miller standard
in judging works "obscene".6 5 Thus, in responding to allegations of
"vagueness" in the Lewitzky case, the NEA argued that the adoption
of the Miller standard cured the vagueness problem, as Miller could
not be vague "as a matter of law".66 However, the Lewitzky court
was unimpressed with the argument, holding that a reliance on
Miller by the NEA did not cure the vagueness problem for two
reasons:
(1) The policy statements made by the NEA regarding a "prom-
ise" to rely on Miller is "not legally binding on the agency". 67
In other words, the court stressed, the NEA could dissolve or
alter its policy "at wil".
68
(2) The NEA is not, at least currently, in a position to offer the
proper procedural safeguards set forth in Miller, namely:
(a) that there be a statute which so specifically articulates
what conduct or depiction is prohibited as to give people
"fair notice" of what is or is not permissible;
(b) that there be a full adversarial trial; and
(c) that there be "a jury of citizens applying community stan-
dards for obscenity".
The Lewitzky court stated that "[e]ven if [we] were to make the
generous assumption that the NEA could satisfy the first two proce-
dural prerequisites 7 0 the third safeguard is unobtainable by an ad-
ministrative agency of the federal government . . . that, by
hypothesis, is incapable of applying varying community standards
for obscenity.171 The certification requirement left grantees no re-
course but to "speculate at their peril" as to what the NEA might
64. Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 781.
65. See infra note 99 and accompanying text; notice of this "adaptation" to reli-
ance upon the Miller standard was sent by the NEA to grantees in July of 1990 in
the "Statement of Policy and Guidance for the Implementation of Sec. 304." The
Lewitzky case was subsequently filed that same month.
66. Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 781.
67. Id. at 782. As the court held in Telecommunications Research and Action
Center v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1986), "(A] general statement of
policy is the outcome of neither a rulemaking nor an adjudication; it is neither a
rule nor a precedent but is merely an announcement to the public of the policy
which the agency hopes to implement in future rulemaking or adjudications."
(quoting Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also
Vietnam Veterans v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("mhe agency remains free in any particular case to diverge from whatever out-
come the policy statement or interpretive rule might suggest.").
68: Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 782.
69. Id. See also Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25, 27-28, 31-35.
70. See infra note 74; the NEA has no administrative review process in place.
71. Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 782 (emphasis added).
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find obscene in the grantee's local community.7 2 The court noted
that the NEA had not even addressed this issue.73
c. Prior Restraint
The law acted as a "prior restraint" 74 on expression because it:
(a) screened applications for future funding based on the content of
samples submitted; and (b) made the release of promised funds con-
tingent on the signing of the certification requirement. The law had
the power to prevent a new and obviously talented artist from get-
ting the crucial funding she needed to get her career off the ground
if she did not pass the screening test or the "loyalty oath" require-
ment.75 The Lewitzky court recognized these fears:
[M]any major legitimate artistic projects will not be undertaken
either for fear of violating the vague terms of the certification, or
even merely for fear of becoming embroiled in a dispute with the
NEA over an accusation that the work of art in question might vio-
late the certification. 7 1 [Thus] the vagueness of the statute forces
grant recipients to avoid even coming close to the line between
72. Id. at 25 (citing Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1967)).
73. Id.
74. A prior restraint, as opposed to punishment after the speech has occurred, is
an attempt to prevent certain expression before it happens. The government's use
of prior restraints is highly restricted. See Case Comment, Vance v. Universal
Amusement Co., sic. 100 S.Ct. 1156, 26 N.Y.L.ScH. L. Rzv. 1122, 1128 (1981). As
the Supreme Court held in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919),
"[i]t well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not
confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main
purpose .... ." Id.
Those who believe that "prior restraint" arguments have no place in this debate
would do well to reconsider in light of the Supreme Court's determination that, for
a prior restraint to be constitutionally permissible, it:
[C]annot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect of final-
ity to the censor's determination .... [Oinly a procedure requiring a judi-
cial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint . . .. [T]he
procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize
the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial (of a
license].
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1964). See also Vance v. Universal
Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 309 (1980).
It is significant that courts do not have jurisdiction over NEA decisions. NEA
decisions are final, and judicial or applicant review of the consideration process is
not permissible. See Note, Artistic Freedom and Government Subsidy: Performing
Arts Institutions in the United States and West Germany, 6 HAsTWos Iwr'L & CoMP. L.
Rsv. 803, 824 (Spr. 1983).
75. Many have likened the NEA's certification requirement to a McCarthy era
loyalty oath, whereby persons were made to swear against the commission of future
"communist" activities. See e.g., N.Y. Times, Jul. 9, 1990, at C13, col. 1; L.A. Times
(syndicated in the Albany Times Union, Aug. 23, 1990, at 32, col. 1).
76. Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 782 (quoting from brief of amicus Rockefeller I
Foundation at 54).
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what is merely provocative and ... what is proscribed."
It is not hard to imagine that arts institutions in need of NEA grant
money have been censoring the art they exhibit, so as not to jeop-
ardize either present 8 or future NEA and private grants. 79 By ex-
tension, artists are no doubt being more conservative in the art they
submit to galleries and museums.80 Without governmental support
for their work, many artists cannot afford to produce any work which
they know or suspect would not make it past the government censor.
Thus, creativity has been and - as long as the NEA focuses on ob-
scenity - will continue to be, hampered. We can expect that after
"five or ten years, American art w[ill] show 'a sameness, the rough
edges being smoothed.' " Indeed, it may not "be long before Nor-
man Rockwell paintings h[a]ng in every museum across the
country."
8 2
2. The Focus on Content
It is an untenable argument that content is as valid a discretionary
factor as any other in screening art applications. Neither the NEA's
mandate8" nor the legislative history behind its creation 84 permits
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
80. As performance artist Karen Finley described it, "[there are artists right now
who are changing their art because they are scared." Telephone conversation with
Karen Finley, Aug. 1989 (quoted in Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Ob-
scenity Law, 99 Ym L.J. 1359, 1373 n.105 (1990)).
81. Judith Baca, Co-founder of the Social & Public Art Resources Center in Ven-
ice, Cal. (quoted in Wash. Post, Mar. 24, 1990, at 1, col. 3).
82. Ira Glasser, Exec. Dir. ACLU, Street News (editorial), July, 1990, at 11.
83. The NEA was created with an extremely broad mandate:
[to] establish and carry out a program of grants-in-aid to groups, or... to
individuals engaged in or concerned with the arts, for the purpose of en-
abling them to provide or support in the U.S.:
(1) productions which have substantial artistic and cultural significance,
giving emphasis to American creativity and the maintenance and en-
couragement of professional excellence;
(2) productions, meeting professional standards or standards of authentic-
ity, irrespective of origin which are of significant merit and which,
without such assistance, would otherwise be unavailable to our citizens
in many areas of the country;
(3) projects that will encourage and assist artists and enable them to
achieve standards of professional excellence ....
MzRRymAm & ErEi, supra note 1, at 339 (emphasis added).
84. The Declaration of Purpose of the National Foundation on the Arts and Hu-
manities Act of 1965, from which the NEA was created, reads as follows:
'The practice of art and the study of the humanities require constant dedi-
cation .... It is necessary and appropriate for the Federal government to
help create and sustain not only a climate encouraging freedom of
thought, imagination and inquiry, but also the material conditions facilitat-
ing the release of this creative talent.'
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content alone to be the basis for screening artwork for funding. No-
where in the NEA's mandate is it stated or implied that the NEA may
or should look to a work's content separate and apart from its artistic
merit.
Furthermore, the first amendment has generally been held to pro-
tect the content of speech,8" including "symbolic"8 6 speech and/or
artistic expression.87 Even if it be said that the first amendment does
allow the time, place, and manner of speech to be regulated, 8 it
must be recognized that when applied to art, this type of regulation
may well restrict the substance of the artist's message. For in art, not
only may the form of a work be as significant as its content, in effect,
it may be its content. It is logical, therefore, for the first amendment
to protect the form or manner of the artistic expression.
8 9
3. The Choice to Fund
Those who argue that taxpayers should not have to fund art that is
Id. at 336 (emphasis added).
In light of this recognition, it was hoped that the Foundation would help "de-
velop and promote a broadly conceived national policy of support for the humani-
ties and the arts in the United States .... ." and that in "decentralizing" the arts,
"artistic excellence could be enjoyed and appreciated by far greater numbers of
our citizens, in each State of the Union." Id. at 338-39, 341 (emphasis added).
In part, the forerunner of the NEA was created in response to the realization that:
There is a Rnancial crisis facing the arts in the U.S., which stems primarily
from the inadequacy of private sources to support artistic excellence at an
appropriate level and to foster and develop an environment which would
fully stimulate the resources of American creative expression ....
Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
85. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. at 537-38,
wherein the Court held that:
The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not
only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of pub-
lic discussion of an entire topic .... If the marketplace of ideas is to re-
main free and open, governments must not be allowed to choose "which
issues are worth discussing or debating" ..... To allow a government the
choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that
government control over the search for political truth.
(citations omitted).
86. "Symbolic" speech is discussed, infra Sec. III B-C.
87. As the Court held in Roth, "The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and
scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional pro-
tection of freedom of speech and press." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487
(1957).
88. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
89. "The lesson is that courts in first amendment cases must be sensitive to the
'medium' as well as the 'message'; otherwise, the message, whatever it might be,
may well be lost by governmental regulation of the medium." Nmmoo, Artistic Ex-
pression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, The Sublime and The First Amend-
ment [hereinafter "NmumoD"], 1987 Wis. L. REv. 221, 246 n. 145 and accompanying
text.
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"offensive" and which they would not choose to view if on display in
a gallery should be reminded that:
No such choice is allowed to taxpayers who do not wish to pay for
a bloated military establishment, or for throwing people in prison
rather than offering them treatment for drug addiction, or for aid
to reprehensible governments, or for the Congressional franking
privilege. They have to pay anyway.90
Funding only art which does not touch on certain subject matters
would contravene the American ideal of encouraging a free market-
place of ideas.9 1 Furthermore, why is a concern over protecting the
"moral welfare" of the public a valid concern when the only per-
sons who will view the art are those who go to theatres, museums,
galleries and the like, specifically for the experience? 92
What is frightening, is that since the 1989 law was passed, NEA
panelists, more than ever, are aware of what types of artwork or per-
formance art they would be better off not sponsoring. Though the
law has been tempered, it is difficult to imagine that some degree of
censorship will not take place, even if on a subconscious level by
panelists. Given the subjective nature of the review process,9" as
well as the fact that NEA decisions are not subject to inquiry or chal-
lenge by applicants or the judiciary,94 NEA censorship could es-
cape public notice.95
90. Wicker, A Chilling Prospect (editorial), N.Y. Times, Jul. 5, 1990, at 17, col.
1.
91. Justice Holmes, in his dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919), introduced the idea that maintaining a marketplace of ideas is crucial to the
progress of a society (cited in Note, supra note 38 at 222).
92. See discussion of this point infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. See
also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114,
308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 257 N.E.2d 30 (1970).
93. For example, what is "serious. .. merit"? What separates a sexual depiction
considered "art" from one considered "obscene"? See infra, Sec. IV.
94. See Note, Artistic Freedom and Government Subsidy: Performing Arts Insti-
tutions in the United States and West Germany, 6 HAsTmos INT'L & CoMP. L. REv.
803, 824 (Spr. 1983).
95. Certain types of censorship occurred even before the NEA brouhaha. For
instance, when retraction of the AIDS exhibition grant was being discussed, Jacob
Neusner, a member of the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton told
Frohnmayer that in 1986 the National Council on the Arts rejected an application
as "too political." The proposal by the Washington Project for the Arts was for a
"high tech soap box" - a truck with speakers and a stadium-sized video screen -
which would broadcast statements about free speech before the White House,
Supreme Court and Congress. Neusner had told Frohnmayer that "the entire de-
bate had to do with whether or not we wanted to finance political demonstrations in
the name of art." "[F]or fear of arousing accusations of censorship," the only expla-
nation given the director of the Washington Project when the application was re-
jected, was that there was concern among Council members regarding the
"intrinsic aesthetic value," "potential quality" and "artistic merit" of the exhibit.
No mention of politics was made. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1989, at C13, col. 1.
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D. The Aftermath of the Funding Law
Although the law was not renewed in its original form in 1990,
various impermissible restrictions were retained or newly written
into the 1990 appropriations law. In July of 1990, new guidelines
were adopted because of mounting concerns that the statutory re-
strictions imposed by the 1989 law were "vague" and possibly even
unconstitutional." Frohnmayer, himself, less than a month after the
1989 law went into effect, had deemed it "unnecessary", and vowed
to work towards its removal.9 7
Though the new guidelines retained the infamous certification re-
quirement as a prerequisite to receiving funds, 98 the NEA changed
their internal screening policy, this time promising to rely on the
Supreme Court's Miller standard in judging works obscene.99 In a
"Supplemental Statement of Policy" effective September 18, 1990,
the NEA clarified that "obscenity" for the purposes of the screening
guidelines meant "the sort of 'patently offensive representations or
descriptions of that specific hard core sexual conduct given as ex-
amples in Miller . .. ' "100
The July 1990 guidelines also contained NEA promulgated "Pro-
cedures for Implementing Sec. 304". An investigation panel was
created to follow up on tips from "any reliable source"' ' 1 regarding
a violation of the restrictions against obscenity as defined by Miller.
The grantee in question would be asked to file a written justificaion
of her project with an explanation of how it complied with the lan-
guage in the NEA's 1990 appropriations legislation. If the justifica-
96. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1991, at C14, col. 6 (quoting from Subcommittee Re-
port written by Henry Wray, Gen'l Counsel, G.A.O.).
97. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1989, at C26, col. 3.
98. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1990, at 13, col. 1. By early July of 1990, of the hun-
dreds of agency grants already approved, approximately 12 recipients had signed
the pledge under protest, 6 had refused to sign and thus forfeited their grants (in-
cluding Joseph Papp, Director of the New York Shakespeare Festival and Bella
Lewitzky, the Artistic Director of a non-profit dance company in L.A.), and various
challenges had been brought in federal court regarding the pledge (in New York
City, Jonathan Fanton, President of the New School for Social Research, on behalf
of the New School; in Los Angeles, Bella Lewitzky and the Newport Harbor Art
Museum).
99. Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 781. See supra, the Miller test, notes 53-55 and
accompanying text.
100. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; and note 56 and accompanying
text, regarding why the Supreme Court would uphold this "Supplemental State-
ment of Policy". But see, supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text, why the
Lewitzky court would argue that this reliance on Miller would not cure the problem
due to the lack of procedural safeguards provided by the NEA to enforce such a
policy in a predictable fashion. In short, the Lewitzky court found that the standard
to which grantees would be held under this policy was so vague as to cause them to
have to "speculate at their peril" as to what the NEA would find obscene.
101. The "reliable source" referred principally to members of Congress. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 24, 1990, at C16, col. 5.
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tion was found insufficient by the NEA, the grant would be
recouped.10
2
These new guidelines, meant to help "grant recipients.., avoid
violating the legislative language,"'10 3 seemed only to sharpen the
debate. After the guidelines were promulgated, five lawsuits were
filed against the NEA.10 4 The controversy centered around the
pledge, which was denounced as an unconstitutional prior
restraint.' 0 5
Chairman Frohnmayer refused to capitulate, not only to the con-
cerns of the public, but to the National Arts Council' 0 6 and an in-
dependent bipartisan commission,1 0 7 both of which voted to
eliminate the pledge. Frohnmayer vowed to enforce the pledge re-
quirement until the pending court cases had been decided.' 08
In October of 1990, responding to the twenty-six amendments
proposed in the House and Senate, Congress rewrote the NEA's au-
thorizing legislation in a compromise bill. The bill, which
reauthorizes' 0 9 the NEA for three more years, leaves judgments
about obscenity and pornography to the courts, using Miller as the
standard.
Most in the art world were appeased by the new law until it was
discovered that the final version commands the NEA Chairman to
ensure that grants be "sensitive to the general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs of the American public." 110
"Standards of decency" is perhaps even more vague a criterion than
was "obscene".' 11
Conjuring up images of prior restraint, highly detailed descrip-
tions of proposed works must now be filed by all applicants and in-
102. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1990, at C14, col. 1.
103. Henry Wray, Gen'l Counsel, G.A.O., Id. at C14.
104. See supra note 12.
105. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
106. The National Arts Council, the governing board of the NEA on Aug. 3,
1990, voted 19 to 2 to eliminate the pledge. Albany Times Union, Aug. 23, 1990,
at 32, col. 1.
107. Congress created this commission to review the grant.making procedures of
the NEA. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1990, at C13, col. 5.
108. Albany Times Union, supra note 106.
109. This is the term actually used by Congress. Traditionally, the NEA was "up
for reauthorization" every five years. Thus, it is significant that, in 1990, in the
midst of the arts funding controversy, the NEA was reauthorized for only three more
years.
110. N.Y. Times Nov. 10, 1990, sec. 1 at 13, col. 5.
111. Harvard Law Prof. Kathleen Sullivan worried that the new restriction would
cause artists to steer clear of a "far broader category than obscenity". As attorney
Peter Kyros, former Cultural Adviser to Pres. Jimmy Carter suggested, "[C~ongress
has ... craftfed] a content restriction that doesn't look like one. It's very subtle. If
the law had called for diverse esthetic content, that would be content neutral. But
when it speaks of diverse beliefs and decency, it's making a political judgment." Id.
at 13.
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terim reports of progress filed by all recipients of grants. The bill
did not require an anti-obscenity pledge for 1991 grantees, but did
warn that if a grant recipient were found in violation of the anti-
obscenity laws, she would not only have to return the grant, she
could not apply for a new grant for three years.' 12 Finally, the Na-
tional Council on the Arts, a presidentially-appointed body, was
given complete veto power over all grants." 13
On December 14, 1990, the National Council on the Arts" 4
voted not to impose standards of decency on panelists reviewing
and recommending grants.
On January 9, 1991, a California district court judge held uncon-
stitutional the pledge required of 1989 and 1990 grantees."' On
February 20, 1991, the NEA agreed not to require a grantee, the
New School for Social Research, to sign the anti-obscenity pledge;
in exchange for which, the New School dropped its lawsuit chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the pledge."16 Attorneys for both
sides agreed that the pledge would no longer be required of any
1990 grantee." 7 Instead, the requirement would be replaced by a
statement that the NEA will "enforce the anti-obscenity stipulation
mandated by Congress 'after a grantee has been convicted of violat-
ing a criminal obscenity or child pornography statute and all appeal
rights have been exhausted.' "118
This is not as innocent as it may sound. In fact, such a policy is
wholly objectionable. Grant recipients have always had to specu-
late as to which jurisdictions would be receptive to their work,
knowing that they could be brought up on obscenity charges by any
or all of the states or localities to which their work traveled. 19
However, grantees have not in the past had to promise to give back
their grant money if convicted in a particular jurisdiction, nor have
they had to abstain from applying for a new grant for a number of
years after this conviction. In imposing this de jure revocation pol-
icy, the NEA has gone one step too far, for it is in effect saying, "we
thought you deserved funding, but now that State X thinks other-
wise, we take it back." What becomes immediately apparent is that:
(1) The NEA has not revealed how it proposes to deal with an artist
112. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1990, at C34, col.S. See infra notes 119-22 and accom-
panying text as to why this is an objectionable policy.
* 113. N.Y. Times, supra note 110, at 16.
114. See supra note 16.
115. See Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774
(C.D. Cal. 1991).
116. N.Y. Times, supra note 96.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. A good example of this is the Mapplethorpe exhibit, which rolled through
New York City without incident, yet in Cincinnati caused a museum and its director
to be brought up on obscenity charges. See infra note 215.
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whose work is deemed obscene in only one of the multiple jurisdic-
tions to which it travels; and (2) the chilling effect on artists will be
even greater now than it was when the sole risk they faced was be-
ing convicted under a certain state's obscenity law. Now that artists
risk being stripped of NEA funding as well, they also risk losing
their matching private funds,120 future funds from both sources and,
ultimately, their status in the artworld.
With the stakes now much higher for artists, heightened self-cen-
sorship will result. The process will doubtless be chaotic, with art-
ists having to explore more carefully than ever, the artistic climate
of a state or community before allowing their work to be exhibited
there. Moreover, art institutions will be more selective of the work
they exhibit, knowing (1) that their NEA backing will be stripped if
an exhibition is held to be obscene in a particular jurisdiction, and
(2) that if an exhibition is merely challenged in court, but is not ulti-
mately deemed obscene, the NEA may nevertheless be wary of
funding the institution the next time they apply. In other words, both
artists and arts institutions will, for their own protection, begin to
enforce the "lowest common denominator" rule. 12 1
This leads to another problem: the de facto result of the revoca-
tion policy is that it begins to affect the artwork the NEA chooses to
fund in the first instance. If the NEA strives to avoid funding art
which could potentially be deemed obscene in any jurisdiction in
the United States, it makes sense that the NEA would impose an un-
written "lowest common denominator" test on the artwork it funds.
The motive to adopt this "unwritten policy" is that it would permit
the NEA to avoid the hassle - and possibly the stigma - of having
to recoup funds from convicted grantees, not to mention having to
then redistribute these funds. In short, the NEA has ample reason to
be more discriminate as to whom or what it funds. It is likely to be
more willing to give its support to applicants seeking to exhibit art
already in existence, than to those who wish to produce art, which,
obviously, the NEA cannot yet screen for content. Such a result is
clearly repugnant to the notion of creating and maintaining a mar-
ketplace for the free exchange of ideas; and furthermore, it is di-
rectly contrary to the NEA's mandate.122
In sum, the NEA seems to have stepped on its own toes in invoking
the revocation standard. Changing the policy so that the states are
responsible for the underlying criminal convictions of grantees,
rather than having grantees speculate as to how the NEA will apply
Miller in each locale, ameliorated the problem. Imposing on grant-
120. See supra note 38, where matching of funding is explained.
121. In this context, the "lowest common denominator" means art which is un-
doubtedly safe from obscenity convictions in any state. A good example of this
would be the art of Norman Rockwell.
122. See supra note 83.
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ees the additional threats of revocation and lack of imminent future
funding only serves to demonstrate that, after all, the NEA's primary
focus remains the content of the artist's work.
III. POLITICS AND PERVERSION IN ART
Cubism aims to destroy by designed disorder. Futurism aims to
destroy by the machine myth. Dadaism aims to destroy by ridi-
cule. Expressionism aims to destroy by aping the primitive and
insane. Abstractionism aims to destroy by the creation of brain-
storms. Surrealism aims to destroy by the denial of reason .... 123
A. History
Artists creating works merely to shock or to protest against an aus-
tere, oppressive, or unresponsive government is as old as artwork
itself. 124 In fact, modernism, the movement responsible for much of
the avant-garde art implicated in the funding issue, began in the
name of "liberat[ing] society"'1 21 through a denouncing of the "es-
tablished order".12 6
Throughout history, certain governments have "quieted" free ar-
tistic expression by employing artists as a "public relations arm",17
paying them to create large-scale propagandistic works.128 How-
ever, many more governments have, instead, punished their artistic
123. NAKMOD, supra note 89 at 256 n.193 (citing Hauptmann, "The Suppression
of Art in the McCarthy Decade", ART7ORUM, Oct. 1973, at 48-52). These are the
words of Michigan Congressman George Dondero in 1949, attacking modem art
as "communist-inspired" due to its "depraved" and "destructive" nature. Id.
124. In his sexually explicit and eerie renderings of the Garden of Eden and
other subjects, Hieronymus Bosch, perhaps the Mapplethorpe in shock value of the
15th century, "lashed out at the preoccupation with sin, at the hypocrisy of the
priesthood and even at the Papacy." L.D. Dunon, ART LAw iN A Nursmai [hereinaf-
ter "DunoFT"] at 245 (1984).
125. With modernism came "an increasing preoccupation with the self: unlim-
ited self-realization, authentic self-experience, and subjectivism." NA-MoD, supra
note 89, at 249.
126. Id.
Modernity revolts against the normalizing functions of tradition; modernity
lives on the experience of rebelling against all that is normative .... [It]
continuously stages a dialectical play between secrecy and public scan-
dal; it is addicted to a fascination with that horror which accompanies the
act of profaning, and yet is always in flight from the trivial results of
profanation.
Id. (quoting Habermas, "Modernity - An Incomplete Project", in THE Aw~n-AEs-
THE'c: EssAYs ON POSTMODERN CuL-unz at 10 (Foster ed. 1983)).
127. Mmsmy, & EsEN, supra note 1, at 240. At times, the "force" was more
subtle, in that artists who wished to gain prestige, or merely to put food on the table,
knew.the only way to accomplish this was to "sell" their talents to those who com-
missioned public or private works - usually courtly style portraits, religious icons,
or still lifes. As Leonardo da Vinci once said, "I serve the one who pays me." Id.
128. For example, the German government during both World Wars used artists
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citizens for candor of expression. 1 2 9 The recent funding restrictions
can be analyzed in this light. One artist13 ' has criticized them as an
attempt to "eradicate or at least suppress anything in American cul-
ture that challenges a fundamentalist Christian vision of family hap-
piness ...." He blames the advent of the restrictions on "fears...
the extreme right mask[s]" including "[flear of change, fear of differ-
ence, fear of cultural erosion .... ultimately. . .. a deeper fear... of
the underground sexual desires every individual harbors .... ",, '
Indeed, it has been theorized that the relegation of "obscene"
speech to a lesser first amendment status than other speech reflects
inter alia, "a concern with the possible breakdown of society
.... ,132 The judicial rejection of obscenity, thus manifests a socie-
tal desire to "repress" certain speech,1 3 3 to deny the reality that we
are separated from each other and from society. 134
According to this theory, artists distract themselves from this fe ,r
by engaging in artistic experimentation; 135 and intolerance of such
experimentation may lead to a form of "totalitarianism". 136 Experi-
mental art is equally deserving of first amendment protection be-
cause the sentiments it seeks to convey are as valid as those related
by more conventional art forms. With respect to government fund-
ing of experimental art, "[a]rtists are always probing boundaries and
they always will. But government support is supposed to be about
freeing ideas and opinions." 13 7 The recent imposition of funding
restrictions, while perhaps consistent historically with the silencing
of artists, is sad testimony to the fact that we have not as a civilization
grown from our mistakes.
to communicate the power and influence of the government. DUBOF, supra note
124, at 246-47.
129. In the 16th and 17th centuries, governments across Europe destroyed art-
work, jailing, exiling, or otherwise punishing the artists who used their talents to
protest the government. Even in the 20th century, some governments have contin-
ued to stifle artistic expression when it is used to attack the government and/or the
church. Id. at 246-47.
130. Author David Leavitt, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1990, sec. 2 at 1, 27, col. 5.
131. Id.
132. NAHMOD, supra note 89, at 250-51.
133. Nahmod says the use of the Freudian term "repress" in this context appropri-
ately conveys the desire to silence or extinguish. Id. at 251.
134. Id. at 252.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 261 (citing 1 K. PoPPEy, THE OPEN Socirry mn ITs Emus at 11-17 (5th
ed. 1966)).
137. Ted Berger, Director of the New York Foundation for the Arts, a N.Y. agency
which gives grants and other support to artists (quoted in N.Y. Times, Nov. 19,
1989, sec. 2 at 1, 25, col. 2.
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B. Supreme Court Recognizes First Amendment Protection
for Non-Verbal Speech
It wasn't until the 20th century that artistic expression in the form
of non-verbal communication was seen as "pure speech" - sepa-
rate from but equally worthy of first amendment protection.1 3 8
Since the first "symbolic speech" case in 1931, Stromberg v. Cal-
ifornia,'3 9 it has been apparent that "speech" includes non-verbal
assertions or conduct. In granting blanket first amendment protec-
tion to such speech, however, the Court recognized that there would
be situations wherein protecting the freedom of artistic expression
would run counter to the government's goal of maintaining and pro-
tecting the social order and morality. 140
While the Court in Stromberg devised no test to determine when
speech risked putting the government in such a "situation", the
Court made clear that different types of speech were accorded dif-
ferent values.1 4 ' Thus, it has been held that "political speech" -
"criticism of government and public officials" deserves the most
complete first amendment protection, 142 while libel and obscenity
are unworthy of first amendment protection. 1
43
In United States v. O'Brien,144 a draft-card burning case, the
Court for the first time, laid out a test for determining when first
amendment protections apply to symbolic speech consisting of both
"passive" and "active" elements.' 45 Government regulation of sym-
bolic speech is valid if:
(1) [I]t is within the constitutional power of the Government, i.e.
the police powers; (2) [I]t furthers an important or substantial gov-
138. It was only in the late 18th and early 19th centuries that artists gained com-
plete creative freedom to choose the subject matter, medium of expression, and
even the colors they wished. MmRYMAUN & Eiszm, supra note 1, at 240.
139. 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (law forbidding display of red flag as protest symbol
held unconstitutional).
140. MERRmu & ELsEN, supra note 1, at 277 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
141. It was not until New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), however that a
majority of the Court explicitly acknowledged that certain speech has less social
value than other speech, and may therefore be more strictly monitored. The Ferber
Court held that "it is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been
accepted because . . . the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the
expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is
required." Id. at 763-64.
142. MERRYM.N & ELsEN, supra note 1, at 278; N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
143. MzRRmN & ELSEN, supra note 1, at 278; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942). The question, of course, then became: What is obscenity?
144. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning of draft card sufficiently within governmental
interest to justify incidental limitation of first amendment freedoms).
145. See infra, this section, discussion of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) for definition of these terms.
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ernmental interest; (3) [T]he governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and (4) [The incidental restric-
tion on alleged first amendment freedoms is no greater than is es-
sential to the furtherance of that interest. 146
One year after O'Brien, the Court in Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School District,147 upheld the wearing of
black armbands to school in protest of the war, since the action was
"closely akin to pure speech". 148 The Court so ruled because such
a "passive" protest did not disrupt the normal functioning of school
operations, nor did it infringe on the rights of others. 149
The Court seems to have drawn a crucial dividing line between
the symbolic speech in Tinker - the "silent, passive expression of
opinion"'5 0 - and the symbolic conduct in O'Brien.'5 ' While the
wearing of a black arm band as a protest symbol may, indeed,
through the fusing of content and conduct, communicate an idea as
well as the emotive force behind it, the act is considered "inher-
ently non-disruptive", primarily "silent", "passive", and therefore
permissible speech.'- 2 To the contrary, burning a draft card is seen
as communicating primarily through symbolic "conduct" which
"frustrate[s] the Government's interest",15 3 and is thus subject to the
"restrictive" test laid out by the Court.'5 4
Unfortunately, the Court did not offer a methodology for differen-
tiating between the "pure" speech in Tinker and the "symbolic"
speech in O'Brien. As Justice Harlan remarked in a concurring
opinion one year later:
The Court has... not established a test for determining at what
point conduct becomes so intertwined with expression that it be-
comes necessary to weigh the state's interest in proscribing con-
duct against the constitutionally protected interest in freedom of
expression. '
5 5
One year after Tinker, a defendant's performance of an anti-war
skit while in uniform was held to be protected despite a prohibition
against "discrediting" the armed forces while so attired. The Court
in Schact v. United States'5 6 drew a distinction between merely
"caricaturing military personnel" and "discrediting" them, holding
that to penalize "speaking out" against the government "would be
146. O'Bien, 391 U.S. at 377.
147. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
148. Id. at 505.
149. Id. at 508.
150. Id.
151. NA nMOD, supra note 89, at 253-54.
152. Id.
153. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
154. NAmmoD, supra note 89, at 254. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
155. Cowgill v. California, 396 U.S. 371, 372 (1970) (per curiam).
156. 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
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an unconstitutional abridgement of [the] freedom of speech."15 7 The
subtle difference between O'Brien and Schact seems to lie in the
degree to which the defendant "spoke out" against the government.
The defendant in O'Bien presented a threat to the integrity of the
system. His refusal to accept the draft could have encouraged many
to follow his lead, jeopardizing the government's ability to conduct
an effective defense. In Schact, though the defendant was mocking
the system, in so doing he was acknowledging that the system ex-
isted and indeed was powerful enough to subordinate him to a posi-
tion where humor was the only defense.
Finally, in Spence v. Washington,' s8 the Court held that two fac-
tors would determine whether non-verbal speech should be pro-
tected as "pure speech": (1) the "nature of the... activity"; and.(2)
"the factual context and environment in which it was [per-
formed]". 5 9 To be within first amendment protection, the defend-
ant must demonstrate an "intent to convey a particularized . ..
message" and the "likelihood... that the message would be under-
stood by those who viewed it.' 8e ° The Court reasoned that an ex-
amination of the "factual context and environment" would reveal
the "intent" and "likelihood" that the message would be compre-
hended by third persons.' 61
The Spence test is important because it reflects the Burger Court's
redistribution of the burden of proof from the government to the de-
fendant. For the first time, the Court did not presume that the de-
fendant's conduct deserved first amendment protection, but rather it
required the defendant to prove his/her conduct merited such pro-
tection.1 62 Once the Court was satisfied that the speech deserved
first amendment protection, it then determined a commensurate de-
gree of protection for the speech. If the state's interest(s) in silenc-
ing the speech outweighed the defendant's constitutional rights in
speaking, the invasion of the defendant's constitutional rights was
held to be warranted.
In this case, the speech - hanging an American flag with a peace
sign attached, upside-down from a student's window as a war protest
- was held to be protected. This is because the government was
unable to prove that the interest in (1) "prevention of breach of the
peace"; (2) "protect[ion of] the sensibilities of passersby"; or (3)
"preserv[ation of] the... flag as an unalloyed symbol of our coun-
try," outweighed the constitutional rights of the defendant.163
157. Id. at 62-63.
158. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
159. Id. at 409-10.
160. Id. at 410-11.
161. Id.
162. DuaonF, supra note 124, at 258-59.
163. Spence, 418 U.S. at 412.
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C. The "Symbolic Speech" Test Applied to Art
The "bright.line" between symbolic speech and symbolic con-
duct blurs when applied to artistic expression, which may be related
(1) "passively", (2) via more conduct-oriented communication, or (3)
by way of performance art.18 4
The Spence test was applied to artistic expression in People v.
Radich, 6 in which a gallery owner was convicted for exhibiting
the flag in the form of a phallic symbol protruding from a cross. On
a writ of habeas corpus,' 66 the federal district court held the exhibi-
tion protected under the first amendment. The court cited lack of
proof by the government of "imminent unlawful conduct" or
"probability of public disorder" as a result of the show.167 It also
noted that the state interest in maintaining the purity of the symbol
was not proven because the artist did not destroy the flag in commn-
nicating his idea.168
Relevant to the debate over NEA funding, the Court in Radich
noted that since the exhibit was located on the second story of a
private gallery, Radich had "not impose[d] his ideas upon a captive
audience."'169 Therefore, the state's interest in protecting the public
was insufficient to compel government regulation. 170 Indeed, the
overly sensitive patron could simply "avert (his) eyes". 17 1
164. NA NOD, supra note 89, at 254. Examples of these are, respectively: (1) the
Mapplethorpe or AIDS show photos; (2) video art which may or may not be accom-
panied by music or dialogue; and (3) the work of the shock-artist Karen Finley.
Karen Finley, whose act has been called "obscenity in its purest form", has been
known to "graphically describe.. .violent and bizarre sex acts with priests, chil-
dren, relatives, and the handicapped" as well as smear food in her genitals and
defecate on stage. See Note, supra note 80, at 1369.
165. 26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970), aff'd, 401 U.S.
531 (1971), reh. den., 402 U.S. 989 (1971).
166. United States ex rel. Radich v. Crim. Ct. of N.Y., 385 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
167. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 449 (1969); see infra note
171.
168. See Radich, 385 F. Supp. at 176.
169. Id. at 178.
170. Duaon7, supra note 124, at 258.
171. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (Justice Harlan). Note that the
majority of NEA funded art is privately, as opposed to publicly exhibited or per-
formed. That is, most of the art is experienced only -by the patron's deliberate
choice. As ACLU Executive Director Ira Glasser put it, "I don't have to go to any
museum, bookstore, or theater where art will offend me." Street News, July, 1990,
at 11 (emphasis added).
A good example of this is that in the Mapplethorpe exhibit at the Cincinnati Con-
temporary Arts Center [hereinafter "C.A.C."], the most controversial photos were
placed in a separate room which only those over age 18 could enter. Therefore,
the patron had to (1) choose to visit the C.A.C.; (2) choose to see the exhibit once
inside the C.A.C.; (3) choose to see the most provocative works once inside the
exhibit and after having read posted warnings regarding the "sexually explicit na-
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"Incitement to violence" or the "lawless action" standard, 72
seems similarly out of place when applied to private art. Whether
the expression is political in nature or not, it is hard to imagine, for
instance, how criticisms of several prominent public figures17 3 in the
catalog to the AIDS exhibit would incite someone to violence.' 74 It
was this catalog on which Frohnmayer supposedly based the revo-
cation of the exhibiting gallery's grant money.
175
Denying funding to art based on such a fear would be an unneces-
sary over-extension of the government's control.' 76 According to
the Supreme Court, regardless of where or how the "political" com-
ments were made, as long as they do not "incite to violence", they
should be protected by the first amendment.' 7 7 If NEA guidelines
do not permit political criticism to be made through artwork, then
ture" of several of the photos; and (4) be over 18 to enter the segregated room. In
other words, the works were not thrust at people against their will. N.Y. Times, Mar.
29, 1990, at A1, col. 1.
172. The Court explained the "lawless action" standard in the following manner:
The Constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit
a [s]tate to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law viola-
tion except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing im-
minent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action [e.g.
screaming "fire" in a crowded theatre].
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added).
173. These included John Cardinal O'Connor, Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) who
voted against government funding for information about safe sex on the premise
that it would encourage homosexuality, and Representative William E. Dan-
nemeyer, (R-Cal.) also an outspoken critic of such funding, and the author of a book
which deals with homosexuality as "curable". N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, sec. 2, at
1, col. 2.
174. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text, regarding why Frohnmayer
rescinded the grant. See Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540-41
(S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). In this case against a monthly
magazine which tended to run politically "revolutionary" cartoons, Judge Learned
Hand quipped, "[ilt seems to me... quite plain that none of the language and none
of the cartoons in this paper can be thought directly to counsel or advise insubordi-
nation or mutiny, without a violation of their meaning quite beyond any tolerable
understanding."
175. Due to the subject matter of the AIDS exhibit, it was unclear if the funds
were revoked wholly due to the catalog or not. Either way, neither the controver-
sial subject matter of the pieces, nor the political content of the catalog should have
been viewed as permissible reasons to rescind the grant.
176. Even Cardinal O'Connor, who in the essay is called a "fat cannibal in a
black skirt," N.Y. Post, Nov. 11, 1989, issued a statement that had he been con-
sulted, he "would have urged very strongly that the National Endowment not with-
draw its sponsorship on the basis of criticism against [him] personally." He
continued that he "do[es] not consider [him]self exempt from or above criticism by
anyone." N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1989, at C33, col. 1.
17.7. See, N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
at 447.
It is revealing to note that in 1979, Artists Space, the very gallery hosting the
AIDS show, held an exhibit of abstract works by Donald Newman entitled "The
Nigger Drawings". Despite the fact that a demonstration was immediately called in
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they are unconstitutional as a matter of law.1 7 1
IV. OBSCENITY, OBSCENE ART, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
A. What is Obscenity?
As has been noted, "obscenity" is an elusive concept. For even
when parameters have been placed around it, the parameters were
themselves first subjectively conceived and then are subjectively
perceived by each person seeking to apply them. 179 Further, it is
important to acknowledge that what is thought to be "obscene" is
not only a matter of individual taste; it is, as well, a product of the
time and place in which it arises. For instance, in the early 19th
protest of the "racist" works, the head of the New York State Council on the Arts,
Kitty Carlisle Hart, issued the following statement:
[While the council loathed) the insensitivity expressed toward a large seg-
ment of our public inherent in the use of the title, [the council stood firm in
its position of] encouraging and assisting rather than in any ways limiting
the freedom of expression that is essential to the well-being of the arts.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1989, at C33, col. 1.
178. See Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, supra note 41. Various critics have
agreed with this sentiment. Constitutionel lawyer, Floyd Abrams, called it "an ap-
palling surrender of First Amendment principle", to revoke funds based on the crit-
icism of political figures, in the catalogue. N.Y. Times Nov. 10, 1989, at C33, col.
3. This feeling was echoed by Vartan Gregorian, president of Brown University
and former president of the New York Public Library, in his statement that:
[G]overnment funding should not be used for artists to make controversial
statements is not a good argument .... (For] if you carry that over to sci-
ence and the humanities, then government funding agencies should not
exist. Government money is not the government's; it is the peoples'....
[The goal] is not to silence people but to establish dialogue ....
N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, sec. 2, at 1, col. 2. Picasso indicated that as "political
beings", artists naturally create art which responds to the political events taking
place around them:
What do you think an artist is? An imbecile who only has eyes if he's a
painter, ears if he's a musician, or a lyre in every chamber of his heart if
he's a poet .... Quite the contrary, he is at the same time a political being
constantly alert to the horrifying, passionate or pleasing events in the
world, shaping himself completely in their image .... No, painting is not
made to decorate apartments. It's an offensive and defensive weapon
against the enemy.
Mmuymm & EumN, supra note 1, at 242-43 (quoting Picasso in 1945, cited in Ash-
ton, PicAsso om ART, at 149).
Ironically, Picasso here was defending his ostensible lack of works - aside from
"Guernica" and "Charnal House" - documenting political and historical events,
which many saw as reflective of his "indifference to the fate of mankind". Id. at
242.
179. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring). Jus-
tice Stewart asserted his belief that the only censorable material under the then-
current Roth-test, was hardcore pornography" and the motion picture at issue in
Jacobellis was "not that". See Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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century, "obscene" referred to a violent or supernatural
depiction. I so
While the Court determined as early as 1942 that the first amend-
ment did not protect obscenity,' it was not until 1957, in Roth v.
United States,'8 2 that the Court attempted to define the concept.
The Court set forth a two-prong test for obscenity:18 3
(1) [Whether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity' 8 4 standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient' 8s interests; and
(2) [Whether the material in question is utterly without redeem-
ing social importance. 18
6
This test has been criticized throughout the years as vague and
unenforceable,' 8 7 however, despite these criticisms, the tenets of
180. M=RRyMAE & ELsEm, supra note 1, at 282. See Knowles v. State, 3 Day 103
(Conn. 1808) ("defendant. . .convicted of showing. . .indecent representation
of. .. 'horrid and unnatural monster' that had no eyes, whose ears were mis-
placed.. .whose skin was copper-colored.").
181. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
182. 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (upholding conviction of a New York book and maga-
zine publisher/distributor under a federal obscenity statute for mailing "obscene"
advertisements for an allegedly "obscene" book.).
183. This was an intentional movement away from the English "most susceptible
person" standard, whereby a work was to be screened for obscenity if individual
passages were deemed likely to have a deleterious effect on those most likely to get
hold of it. Case Comment, Obscenity: Is the Value of a Literary or Artistic Work to
be Judged by Individual Community Standards?, 15 S.U.L. Rzv. 129, 130 (1988).
This standard was used by United States courts until it was rejected in 1957 by the
Supreme Court in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
184. The "community standard" in Roth was a national one. See supra note 54, a
discussion of the rejection of this "national" standard in Miller, 413 U.S. at 32-34.
185. "Prurient" was defined by the Court as "lustful thoughts ... itching, morbid
or lascivious longings.., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion."
MmmyMAN & ELsEN, supra note 1, at 286.
186. See Case Comment, supra note 183, at 132.
187. Roth's dissenting Justices Douglas and Black, in an opinion by Justice Doug-
las, reminded the Court that the first amendment was meant to protect the free ex-
change of thoughts, "no matter how disagreeable" these might be to others. Id. at
132-33; See Both, 354 U.S. at 513 ("literature should not be suppressed merely
because it offends the moral code of the censor.").
Scholars William B. Lockhart and Robert C. McClure have argued that "the
court's definition... as... sex in a manner appealing to the prurient interest gets us
nowhere. It simply pushes the core question back one notch and makes us inquire:
What is the appeal to the prurient interest that makes sexual matter obscene?" Case
Comment, supra note 183, at 131 (citing W. Lockhart and R. McClure, Obscenity
Censorship: The Core Constitutional Issue - What is Obscene? 7 UTAH L. REV.
289 (1961).
Similarly, the American Law Institute (ALI) rejected - even before the Roth
Court used it - the "lustful thoughts" definition as "too broad for a society that
accepted a wide variety of erotic interest in artistic works." Dunoz', supra note 124,
at 131. It also rejected the "tendency to corrupt or deprave" test in the face of
insufficient evidence linking obscenity and misconduct. Id. The ALI has focused
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the Roth test are clearly present in the Court's current obscenity
test. 18
The Court's test in Roth reflects a recognition that "sex and ob-
scenity are not synonymous" and that the "portrayal of sex, e.g. in
art, literature and scientific works [is entitled to] the constitutional
protection of freedom of speech and press," providing it is not cate-
gorically obscene."s9 The decision implied the Court's acknowl-
edgment of sex as a legitimate subject to pursue in art.' 9°
Seven years after Roth, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 191 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, emphasized this notion, stating that "ob-
scenity is excluded from the constitutional protection only because
it is 'utterly without redeeming social importance'." s1 9 2 "[Airtistic
creation", on the other hand, "deal[s] with sex in a manner that ad-
vocates ideas, or that has... artistic value... [and thus] may not be
branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional protection."' ' 3
In 1973, the obscenity test still used today was announced by the
Court in Miller v. California,1 9 4 another case involving the mailing
of obscene material. In announcing its new formulation, the Court
remarked that "in the area of freedom of speech and press the
courts must always remain sensitive to any infringement on genu-
inely serious literary, artistic, political or scientific expression," 19'
and that the "permissible scope of... regulation" must be confined
"to works which depict or describe sexual conduct."' 9 6
While the Court intended juries to weigh material for obscenity
under the first two prongs using Roth's gauge of "contemporary
community standards", it made clear that under the first and four-
teenth amendments, the jury need not abide by a national commu-
nity standard, as Roth had held. This was not to say that a jury has
unlimited discretion in such determination, however, for the appel-
late courts may review these determinations if necessary.197 One
instead, on the "nature of the appeal of the material," defining "prurient interest" as
"a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and having an exacer-
bated, morbid or perverted interest growing out of the conflict between the univer-
sal social controls of sexual activity." Id.
188. See supra, the Miller test, note 53 and accompanying text.
189. Mmmnmw & ELsiz, supra note 1, at 286.
190. "Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably
been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the
problems of human interest and public concern." Both v. U.S., 354 U.S. at 487.
191. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
192. Id. at 191.
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See supra, the Miller test, note 53 and accompanying
text.
195. Id. at 22-23.
196. Id. at 24.
197. Id. at 25.
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year later, in Hamling v. United States,19 the Court held once and
for all that the "local" community was a valid standard t9 use in
assessing violations of federal obscenity statutes. 199
B. Problems with the Supreme Court's Definition of
Obscenity: Is it Void for Vagueness?
As has been noted by subsequent courts, the Supreme Court in
Miller left unanswered such pertinent questions as: what size the
"community" in the first prong should be; whose standards should
be used;20 0 and - pertinent to NEA funding - whether the stan-
dard should be based on the community where the artist created the
work, where the exhibit begins, or alternatively, one or a majority of
the locations to which the exhibit will travel.201
Furthermore, while Miller's third prong clarified that "serious"
material merited constitutional protection, the Miller Court left un-
clear whether the value of a work under this third prong should be
assessed using contemporary local community standards or the con-
temporary standards of a broader community. 20 2
In Pope v. Iflinois,20 3 the Court gave a definitive answer to this
third prong question, holding:
The proper inquiry [in deciding whether allegedly obscene mater-
ials had any 'literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,'] is not
whether an ordinary member of any given community would find
... value in... [the] material, but whether a reasonable person
would find such value taking the material as a whole.20 4
The Court reasoned that if, as was held in Miller, works of "seri-
ous.., value" are protected under the first amendment, "regardless
of whether the government or a majority of the people approve of
the ideas these works represent," then it follows that the inherent
value of a work does not vary between localities because of the "de-
gree of local acceptance" it has achieved. 0 ' Thus, the "reasonable
person" standard adopted by Pope represents the Court's choice of
an objective determination of a work's value - the reasonable per-
198. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
199. Id. at 104. Hamling's dicta urges jurors to "draw on [their] own knowledge"
of the community to judge something "obscene" from the vantage point of the "av-
erage person". Id.
200. See e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
201. For instance, the Mapplethorpe show went on without incident in New York;
but in Cincinnati, a city reknowned for having some of the toughest obscenity laws
in the country, the museum director as well as the museum were hauled into court
on criminal obscenity charges as a result of the exhibit.
202. This issue was raised by the Court in Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291,
301-02 (1977).
203. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
204. Id. at 500-01 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 500.
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son - rather than a subjective, local community standard.2 °6
Though the "objective" method of analysis seems to be the one
most favorable to avant garde artists, as noted, even it is not fool-
proof.20 7 No test will ever be completely objective because individ-
ual taste necessarily factors into any "value" determination of a
work. As Justices Brennan and Douglas noted in their separate dis-
sents in Paris Adult Theatres I v. Slaton, 2 0  no test for obscenity
would ever survive constitutional attack:
[S]hort of that extreme [of deeming obscene any depiction of
human sexual organs], it is hard to see how any choice of words
could reduce the vagueness problem .... 209
Art and Literature reflect tastes; and tastes, like musical apprecia-
tion, are hardly reducible to precise definitions. That is one rea-
son I have always felt that 'obscenity' was not an exception to the
First Amendment. For matters of taste, like matters of belief, turn
on the idiosyncrasies of individuals. They are too personal to de-
fine and too emotional and vague to apply ....
2 1 0
The "vagueness" dilemma has continually haunted the Court.2 1 '
206. See Case Comment, supra note 183, at 137. It should be remembered in
this regard, that it is the NEA's fundamental inability to anticipate local judgment
throughout the United States (i.e. the "contemporary community standards" under
the first prong), that caused the Lewitzl.y court to strike down the certification re-
quirement as unconstitutional. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
207. As Justice Scalia wrote in his concurring opinion in Pope:
[I]n my view it is quite impossible to come to an objective assessment of (at
least) literary or artistic value, there being many accomplished people
who have found literature in Dada, and art in the replication of a soup can.
Since ratiocination has little to do with esthetics, the fabled 'reasonable
man' is of little help in the inquiry .... Just as there is no use arguing about
taste, there is no use litigating about it. For the law courts to decide 'What
is Beauty' is a novelty even by today's standards.
481 U.S. at 504-05.
208. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
209. Id. at 94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 70 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
211. As the following quotations attest, the Court has been asked over the years
to rule on matters concerning the vagueness doctrine:
A law will be held void for vagueness as a matter of due process if the
conduct forbidden by it is so unclearly defined that persons 'of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.'
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vague-
ness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
One of the main functions of the vagueness doctrine is to curb the discre-
tion afforded to law enforcement officers or administrative officials and to
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V. AFTER-EFFECTS OF THE LAW
The debate and publicity surrounding this issue have engendered
profound changes in both the political and social climate in
America. Passions have been fired, constituencies mobilized,2 12
and geographic, cultural, religious, political, and economic rifts
created.
Since the first restrictive funding law went into effect in October
of 1989, at least five suits have been filed against the NEA con-
testing the constitutionality of its restrictions in funding. 213 Museum
directors and board members have resigned over sponsorship of
various exhibits,21 4 and for the first time, a museum director and his
museum were brought up on criminal obscenity charges for display-
ing a controversial artist's works.2 1 5 Grants promised have been re-
scinded, some only to be regranted 21 6 and certain grants approved
by the NEA's peer review panels were later rejected by the NEA.217
Recipients of arts awards have refused to accept in protest over the
funding restrictions;21 8 and recipients of funding grants have re-
limit the dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement through ex-
plicit legislative standards.
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (cited in Case Comment,
The Reasonable Person as the Supreme Court's Latest Arbiter of Obscenity, 7 CAR-
D zo Arm & fr. L. J. 185, 193 n.50 (1988)).
212. The Rev. Donald E. Wildmon of Tupelo, Miss. has crusaded against the fund-
ing of "pornography" by the NEA. He raised $5.2 million in 1989 for his American
Family Association. Others who have fought for restrictions in arts funding are Sen.
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), Rep. Dana T. Rohrabacher (R-Cal.), Rep. Peter Dannemayer
(R-Cal.), the evangelist Pat Robertson, and even Oliver North. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2,
1990, sec. 6, at 22, 24, col. 1
213. See supra note 12.
214. Christina Orr-Cahall the director of the Corcoran Gallery in Washington,
D.C. resigned under pressure after she instructed the Gallery to take down the
Mapplethorpe exhibit; Chad Wick, Chairman of the Board of the Contemporary
Arts Center in Cincinnati resigned during the Mapplethorpe furor there.
215. The Director was Dennis Barrie, of the Contemporary Arts Center in Cincin-
nati. Both Barrie and the C.A.C. were acquitted of criminal charges in Oct. of
1990.
216. See supra discussion of the 1989 New York City AIDS show, notes 27-31
and accompanying text.
217. Artists whose grants were vetoed include performers Karen Finley, Holly
Hughes, John Fleck and Tim Miller. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1990, at C3, col. 5. The
Institute of Contemporary Art in Boston was similarly denied a $40,000 grant to
mount an exhibition of the work of artist Mike Kelley, after a peer review panel had
advised the NEA to issue the grant. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at C16,. col. 1.
Between 1981 and 1988, NEA grant rejection following peer review panel ap-
proval had occurred only 35 times out of 33,700. In July of 1990, four out of 18
were rejected, and all four were the above-named performance artists whose acts
included sexually provocative language and/or movement. N.Y. Times, July 6,
1990, at C3, col. 5.
218. Leonard Bernstein refused to accept the National Medal of Arts award in
protest. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
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fused to accept in protest over the requirements placed on appli-
cants and/or recipients.2 19
The NEA's budget was cut $5 million below what President Bush
had requested;2 20 and many who received federal grants in the past
are being forced to find private funding to support their work.2 21 In
fact, the NEA is the only cultural agency which will not receive an
increase in its budget in 1992.222 While Frohnmayer requested
$212 million, the NEA's proposed 1992 budget was left at the 1991
level of $174 million. 2  Meanwhile, the National Endowment for
the Humanities, which has consistently received less funding over
the years than the NEA, will receive an increase of almost five per-
cent'in its budget for fiscal year 1992.224 In 1990, the NEA was
required by Congress to increase its direct state contributions by 7.5
percent, causing a concomitant decrease of $12 million in the
NEA's own budget. 22 9 By 1992, NEA state contributions will be ...p
12 percent over those in 1990.226 These actions have caused
many people in Washington to surmise that the arts endowment is
on probation at the White House."227
On the positive side, the quarterly meetings of the NEA to review
grant applications have now been opened to the public. More im-
portantly, the entire debate has forced Americans to focus on the
quality of our freedoms and the value we place on our culture being
reflected and changed by art - specifically, controversial, so-
called "peripheral" or "shock-art". The public has also been sensi-
tized to any new laws with "language that would smack of censor-
ship ... believ[ing] that once that genie is out of the bottle, freedom
of expression in America in all of its forms is jeopardized."2 '
219. Among others, these include: Bella Lewitzky, Choreographer for the Bella
Lewitzky Dance Foundation in L.A.; Joseph Papp, Director of the N.Y. Shakespeare
Festival; The Paris Review; the Theater for the New City; the Director of the U. of
Iowa Press; The Oregon Shakespeare Festival in Ashland, Oregon; The New
School for Social Research in N.Y.; The American Poetry Review; and The Gettys-
burg Review in Gettysburg, PA. In addition, many other artists and arts organiza-
tions, including the Director of the Lincoln Center Theater in N.Y.C. vowed to
reject grants if once allotted to them, they were forced to sign the pledge. N.Y.
Times, July 9, 1990; Aug. 24, 1990.
220. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1990, at C17, col. 1.
221. See, e.g., the artists mentioned supra note 217.
222. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1991, at C17, col. 1.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Rep. Pat Williams (D-MT.) (quoted in N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1990, at C14, col.
3).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The sharing of ideas among artists across the country has always
been considered integral to the evolution of our culture. Since the
days of our creation as a nation, we have dedicated ourselves to
ensuring the free exchange of ideas across personal boundaries.
This democratic ideal is what has set us apart from and ahead of
other nations. Indeed, the Supreme Court has always assumed that
the first amendment protects the communication of ideas.2 29
A NEA free from governmental influence in grant decision-mak-
ing is crucial to the future of artistic creation in America. In the
words of a former NEA deputy chair: "[m]ore insidious than outright
censorship because it is less visible, is the threat that government
will come to dominate the cultural life of the nation .... Restric-
tive arts funding laws give the government just such a power.
But what of the dissolution of the NEA altogether? If the NEA
were dissolved, artists and arts institutions would have to depend
solely on private contributions and indirect federal government sub-
sidies funded through the tax laws. This would give wealthy private
patrons the critical decision-making power as to which art (and art-
ists) survives, and which is doomed.23 ' The public depends on, and
has a right to expect, the NEA to enable it to experience what the
arts community in the United States is producing. If certain art is
prevented from being produced or exhibited due to the withholding
of government funds based on the work's content, as Americans we
are weaker for the loss of cultural nourishment.232
It will not be long before the ramifications of the series of restric-
229. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. See also Main, The Neglected Prong of the Miner
Test for Obscenity: Serious Literary, Artistic, Political, or Scientifc Value, 11
S.I,..U. L.J. 1159, 1177 (1987).
230. See Note, supra note 74 (quoting M. Straight, at 826 n.170 and accompany-
ing text).
231. "If artistic freedom is considered an objective of a society and one accepts
that greater artistic freedom exists where the arts are not considered competitive
goods, then such insulation from the market is desirable." Id. at 824-25.
232. The rationale of a free development of the arts contemplates freedom
not only from the compulsion of a moral judgment, but from the compul-
sion of a taste judgment as well. It is not only established morality, but
also established taste, which compels allegiance to traditional forms. By
subjecting critically neglected works, whether they be avant-garde or
commercially oriented, to the risk of prosecution under the definitional
standards, and privileging those works acknowledged as meritorious by
the panjandrums of criticism, we may unwittingly be furthering a stultifica-
tion of art by permitting the proscription of those vital and challenging
expressions that vivify the creative process. Any prior determination of
the first amendment right on the basis of merit obviously defeats its historic
rationale: that the survival of the best depends upon the unfettered con-
flict between individual forms.
MERRYMA & ELSEN, supra note 1, at 290-91 (quoting from Note, Obscenity Prosecu-
tion: Artistic Value and the Concept of Immunity, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rsv. 1063, 1084-85
(1964)).
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rive funding laws are fully understood. Even if the funding guide-
lines are eventually completely restored to the original merit-based
factors, it may be too little, too late. The seed has been planted.
Whether subconsciously or not, NEA panelists are well aware of
what type of art sponsorship is guaranteed to stir up controversy.2 s s
Their "steering clear" of such tumult can only hurt us all in the end.
Indeed, it may mean the collapse of experimental art in America.2 3 4
Anne L. Body
233. As one Congressional Representative remarked:
[Ilt may be we are entering the quicksand of censorship .... [we] must
thoughtfully consider whether the Federal Government can maintain an
environment necessary for artistic creativity to flourish while fulfilling the
recent Congressional mandate that bans assistance to certain art based on
content, not quality. Congressional pressure has placed NEA on a slip-
pery slope.
Rep. Pat Williams (D-MT.), opening remarks, session of House Subcommittee over-
seeing NEA, (quoted in N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1989, at C26, col. 3).
234. Author David Leavitt warns that it is conceivable for there to be a "mass
exodus of artists out of America to Europe" where there is much greater state sup-
port of the arts, and where a thriving economy is conducive to wooing foreign art-
ists. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1990, sec. 2 at 1, 27, col. 5. In this regard, it should be
noted that the British government is giving 11% more money to the arts in 1991, for
a total of $37 million more dollars, enabling its quasi-governmental Arts Council to
raise individual grants 8 to 9% each. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1990, sec. 1, at 16, col.
5.
